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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
intestate had no control over the driver, even though it varied the
conventional definition by saying, in absence of such control, that




A citizen of Kentucky, beneficiary under a $15,000 accident in-
surance policy, brought suit in the state courts against the insurer, a
non-resident company. To avail itself of the fact that the Federal
courts would enforce the provision of the policy requiring suit to be
brought within two years from the expiration of the time within
which proofs of loss were to be made whereas the Kentucky courts
would not, defendant removed the case to the Federal District Court.
Plaintiff took a non-suit without prejudice and brought a new suit in
the state courts but limited his prayer for relief to $2,999.99. De-
fendant again removed the cause and plaintiff, after his motion to
remand was overruled, allowed a judgment by default in favor of
defendant. Plaintiff appealed, and the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the prayer for relief determined the amount involved for juris-
dictional purposes, and since it was less than $3,000, the motion to
remand should have been granted.1
For reasons similar to those motivating the plaintiff in the prin-
cipal case there are frequent resorts to devices either to confer 2 juris-
diction on the Federal courts or to prevent its attaching.2 It is gen-
erally deducible from the decisions that the device will be approved
provided it is bona fide and some substantial right is in fact relin-
quished. Since the principal case involves a liquidated claim, it
presents, it seems, merely a more obvious variation of the generally
sanctioned limitation of unliquidated claims. 4 But since the amount
'Brady v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 68 F. (2d) 302 (C. C. A.
6th, 1933); see also Brown et a! v. House, 20 F. (2d) 142 (S. D. Idaho,
1927) ; Woods v. Massachusetts Protective Ass'n., 34 F. (2d) 501 (E. D. Ky.
1929); Henderson el al v. Maryland Casualty Co., 62 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932) ; cf. Smith v. Traveller's Protective Ass'n., 200 N. C. 740, 158 S. E.
402 (1931).
2 Williamson v. Oeenton, 232 U. S. 619, 34 Sup. Ct. 442, 58 L. ed. 758
(1914); Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and White Taxicab Co., 276
U. S. 518, 48 Sup. Ct. 404, 72 L. ed. 681 (1929) ; note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV.
320; note (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 311.
' Richardson v. Southern Idaho Waterpower Co., 209 Fed. 949 (D. Idaho
1913) ; Kraus v. Chicago B. and Q. R. R., 16 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
'Swann v. Mutual Res. Fund Life Ass'n, 116 Fed. 232 (W. D. Ky. 1902) ;
Barber v. Boston and Maine R. Co., 145 Fed. 52 (D. Vt. 1906); Harley v.
Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 471 (W. D. Wash. 1913).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
of a liquidated claim clearly must show on the face of the pleadings,
whereas in an unliquidated claim it must of necessity be conjectural,
it seems that the court missed an excellent opportunity to take ad-
vantage of the patent nature.of the device and pierce it.5 The appar-
ent desire to protect Federal jurisdiction by facilitating removal,
evinced by the recent celebrated Black and White Taxicab Co. case,6
would lead one to anticipate a different result in the principal case.
The present decision makes for uniformity in that any type of
claim may be limited to defeat federal jurisdiction. But it also in-
volves inconsistencies. In cases involving unliquidated claims the prayer
controls jurisdiction so long as the pleadings by inspection do not
show inability to recover the jurisdictional amount.7  But in other
cases the "court will look to the face of the complaint and upon the
facts as there disclosed, decide what the actual demand for recovery
is."8 Here apparently in order to recover anything at all the plain-
tiff would have to plead the 15,000 policy upon which he based his
claim. Then, applying the rule last noted, the court would find that
$15,000 was the amount involved. But in the principal case it de-
parted from the rule and accepted the prayer as conclusive. This is
further inconsistent with the Federal practice which, once a suit is in
the Federal courts, permits a recovery of any amount the facts, as
proved, demand, whether more or less than prayed for9 and whether
less than the $3,000 minimum limitation on Federal jurisdiction.10
Since, however, the Federal courts follow state court rules in assess-
ing damages in default judgments,1 in many cases of default judg-
I Texas and Vermont apparently make the nature of the claim the criterion
of the right to remit for jurisdictional purposes. Fuller v. Sparks, 39 Tex.
137 (1873) ; Pecos and N. T. R. Co. v. Canyon Coal Co., 102 Tex. 478, 119
S. W. 294 (1909) ; Perkins v. Rich, 12 Vt. 595 (1840).
' Supra note 2.
'Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U. S. 58, 21 Sup. Ct. 17, 45 L. ed. 84 (1900);
Fernandina Shipbuilding and Dry Dock- Co. v. Peters, 283 Fed. 621 (S. D.
Fla. 1922) ; DOME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) §56, at 144.
" Vance v. W. A. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 468, 18 Sup. Ct. 645, 42 L. ed. 1111
(1898); Brown v. House, supra note 1; Doam, FEDERAL PRocEDURE (1928)
§56, at 142.
17 STAT. 197 (1872), 28 U. S. C. A. §724 (1926) ; cases infra note 16.
Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U. S. 550, 6 Sup. Ct. 501, 29 L. ed. 729 (1886) ;
Roessler-Hasslacher Chem. Co. v. Doyle, 142 Fed. 118 (C. C. A. 3d, 1905);
Armstrong v. Walters, 223 Fed. 451 (E. D. Pa. 1915).
'Raymond v. Danbury and N. R. Co., Fed. Cas. No. 11,593 (D. Conn.
1877); Cape Fear Towing and Transportation Co. v. Pearsall, 90 Fed. 435
(C. C. A. 4th, 1898) ; Orsinger v. Consoltdated Flour Co., 284 Fed. 224 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1922).
THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ment the prayer would probably be conclusive of the amount recov-
ered.12
A more important and more striking inconsistency in Federal
practice is made evident by the principal case. There the court ap-
proved a reduction of' the claim to prevent Federal jurisdiction at-
taching when accomplished by means of a non-suit in the Federal
court and a new suit in the state courts upon a limited demand. Yet
the general rule is that, once in the Federal courts, the plaintiff will
not be permitted to amend his complaint so as to reduce his claim to
less than $3,000 and thus force the court to remand the case, unless
the demand was excessive through a bona fide error.13
Should the plaintiff attempt to recover the full $15,000 in his suit
in the state court by amending his prayer for relief the defendant
could petition for removal.14 ' The prayer would be evident on the
pleadings, which with the record at the time of the motion, determine
removability.' 5
But there seems a possibility that the plaintiff might recover
$15,000 in the state courts by taking advantage of a common rule of
state court practice: any relief demanded by the facts will be
granted.16 To recover anything at all plaintiff would have to prove
the $15,000 policy. Thus at the close of the evidence the jury would
be instructed to render a judgment consistent with the facts as they
found them proved. If the defendant attempted to remove prior to
judgment in such a case, it is likely that he would be denied because
" This would be true in North Carolina. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §632; see Orsinger v. Consolidated Flour Co.,
supra note 11.
"Johnson v. Computing Scale Co., 139 Fed. 339 (N. D. N. Y. 1905);
Donovan v. Dixieland Amusement Co., 152 Fed. 661 (E. D. N. Y. 1907);
Twin Hills Gasoline Co. v. Bradford Oil Corp., 264 Fed. 440 (E. D. Okla.
1919).
1"36 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §72 (1926) (the removal petition
must be filed ". . . in such State court at the time, or any time before the
defendant is required by the laws of the State or the rule of the State court
in which suit is brought to answer or plead to the declaration or complaint of
the plaintiff."). But where by amendment during the trial plaintiff for the
first time sets out a case within Federal jurisdiction defendant can petition
for removal. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Austin, 135 U. S. 315, 10 Sup. Ct. 758,
34 L. ed. 218 (1890) ; Bagenas v. Southern Pac. Co., 180 Fed. 887 (N. D. Cal.
1910); Key v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 237 Fed. 258 (W. D. Ky. 1916).
'Herbert v. Roxana Petroleum Corp., 12 F. (2d) 81 (E. D. Ill. 1926);
Kelly v. Alabama-Quenelda Graphite Co., 34 F. (2d) 790 (N. D. Ala. 1929).
" Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 Pac. 1049 (1926) ; Smith v. Smith, 67
Kans. 841, 73 Pac. 56 (1900) ; Caldwell v. Ewbanks, 326 Mo. 185, 39 S. W.
(2d) 976 (1930) ; Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N. Y. 457, 138 N. E. 406 (1923);
Jones v. Atlantic and Western R. Co., 193 N. C. 590, 137 S. E. 706 (1927).
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the pleadings would remain precisely as they were when the Federal
court previously denied removal, and the record would be in accord
with the pleadings.11 A motion to remove after judgment would
come too late because there would be no case pending on which the
removal order could act.1 8
Whitcomb v. Smithson affords an interesting speculation on the
possibilities of removal which would arise in the case last supposed
when the judge instructed the jury to grant any relief the facts de-
manded.' 9  There it was held that a suit hitherto outside Federal
jurisdiction because of the joinder of a resident defendant was not
made removable by the judge's instructing the jury to find in favor
of the resident defendant thus leaving the petitioner, a non-resident,
the only interested defendant. The rationale of the decision was that
the judge, and not the plaintiff by his voluntary act,20 brought the
case within the scope of Federal jurisdiction. Would it be the act of
the plaintiff in proving a $15,000 claim, or the act of the judge apply-
ing the law in his instructions which would bring the present supposed
case within the limits of Federal jurisdiction?
Assuming that the plaintiff had recovered a judgment for $15,000
in the state courts could the defendant obtain an injunction from the
Federal courts against enforcement of the judgment? By Section
265 of the Judicial Code 2 ' the Federal courts are prohibited from
staying proceedings of a state court or its officers. By judicial de-
cisions22 the Federal courts today have apparently succeeded in cir-
cumventing the statute and will enjoin proceedings prior to judg-"
ment and subsequent thereto. The cases imply the limitation that the
injunction must operate upon the parties and not the court, and that
I But see: City of Chicago v. Mills, 204 U. S. 321, 328, 27 Sup. Ct. 286, 51
L. ed. 504 (1907) citing Kirby v. Am. Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S. 141, 24
Sup. Ct. 619, 48 L. ed. 911 (1904) as authority for the proposition: ("The
question of jurisdiction must be decided having reference to the attitude of the
case at the date the bill was filed.") ; Fielding v. Toledo and 0. C. R. Co., 33
F. (2d) 994 (N. D. Ohio, 1928).
136 STAT. 1095 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §72 (1926) ; see State ex rel Hall v.
Kelley, 220 Mo. App. 388, 286 S. W. 724 (1926).
0 Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U. S. 635, 20 Sup. Ct. 248, 44 L. ed. 303
(1900).
I Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U. S. 276, 316, 38 Sup. Ct.
237, 62 L. ed. 713 (1918). "It must appear, to make the case a removable one
as to a non-resident defendant, because of dismissal as to resident defendants,
that the discontinuance as to such defendants was voluntary on the part of the
plaintiff."); Moeller v. Southern Pacific Co., 211 F. 239 (N. D. Cal. 1913).
2136 STAT. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (1926).
= See Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceed-
ings in State Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169.
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a judgment which is unconscionable for fraud, accident, or mistake
whereby defendant was prevented from setting up a meritorious de-
fense will be enjoined. But the power does not extend to relieve
from judgments on account of errors or irregularities on which the
judgment was founded.23 Although it would seem that the Federal
court could hardly expect, by accepting the prayer for relief as con-
clusive of the amount involved, to limit the state courts to this inter-
pretation, the language of the principal case suggests that a recovery
for more than the amount prayed for at the time removal was denied
would be deemed a fraud on the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. 24
For this reason the judgment might be enjoined.
JOE EAGLES.
Suretyship-Extent of Liability on Sheriff's Official Bond.
In State of North Carolina ex rel. Wintmer v. Leonard' the
relator was wrongfully shot by a North Carolina sheriff. Action was
brought in a Federal court on the sheriff's official "process bond,"
which contains a clause for the faithful execution of office. Held, a
demurrer to the complaint was properly sustained. Such a general
clause of faithfulness in all things in an official bond is limited to
the specific duties mentioned therein, i.e. in the "process bond" the
due execution and return of process, and the payment of money and
fees collected.
Wrongful acts of a public official which render him personally
liable to a person injured thereby have been placed in three catego-
ries : acts done by virtue of office, acts done under color of office, and
those done by the official in his private capacity. All courts hold that
the sureties on the officer's official bond are not liable for acts of the
latter type.2 Many courts hold that a bond conditioned for the faith-
2 Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U. S. 175, 41 Sup. Ct. 93, 65 L. ed. 205
(1920); National Surety Co. of N. Y. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 Fed.
593 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903); Horton v. Stegmyer, 175 Fed. 756 (C. C. A. 8th,
1910).
" Brady v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, supra note 1, ("Having
the right to determine the amount she would claim, the filing of a suit for such
amount in the State court was not in our opinion a fraud on the jurisdiction
of the Federal court.").
168 F. (2d) 228 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934).
' Feller v. Gates, 40 Ore. 543, 67 Pac. 416 (1902) (constable received money
from execution debtor under contract not to serve execution, the constable to
repay money on reversal of judgment on appeal. Held, a personal act, so sure-
ties on his official bond not liable for conversion of the money.); Citizen's
State Bank of Wheeler v. American Surety Co., 65 S. W. (2d) 778 (Tex.
1933) (sheriff filed list of fees, including several unlawful ones and received
